At the Specialist Chambers, the words “you are found not guilty” have not yet been heard in the courtroom.

Every accused person who has appeared before a trial panel in The Hague has been convicted.

September 16 is the last opportunity to change this frightening imbalance, which closely resembles a much-criticized post-Second World War trial in Japan.

The Tokyo Trial, held from 1946 to 1948 and described as “victors’ justice,” is considered one of the principal examples in the debate over the overall rate of convictions and the controversy over whether fundamental principles of justice were respected.

In Tokyo, the defendants were Japanese political and military leaders, and the outcome was 100%: 25 people were tried and all 25 were convicted, not counting one person who was initially declared mentally unfit.

In these 6 years, all 7 people tried at the Specialist Chambers have been convicted.

For 4 others, Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi—the most important trial in the history of Kosovo’s war for freedom, but also one widely contested for major violations—the verdict will be delivered on September 16.

Beyond the statistical similarities, there is something that links the Specialist Chambers and the Tokyo Trial in a disturbing way.

Studies from that time, as well as those conducted years later, cast a shadow of doubt over the Tokyo Trial—concerning its prior political aims, a process marked by an imbalance between the parties, a short preparation period for the defense, inadequate interpretation services, and restrictions on defense witnesses.

In The Hague, at the Specialist Chambers, a report by a prestigious British lawyers’ organization has identified serious concerns related to the equality of arms—including inadequate access and time to prepare the defense, failure to verify evidence, shortcomings in challenging administrative decisions and judicial appointments, as well as structural obstacles to release from detention.

What happened in Tokyo and is now happening in The Hague, in the KLA case, in terms of the percentage of convictions among the accused, did not happen even at the Nuremberg Trials in Germany after the Second World War.

Rodney Dixon, Kadri Veseli’s lawyer, also cited the example of Nuremberg in his closing statement.

Nuremberg will be remembered, although widely criticized, for acquitting 3 of the 22 accused; it did so because their involvement in crimes could not be proven.

“Most importantly, where there was insufficient evidence that some of the defendants tried at Nuremberg had criminally participated in the alleged war crimes or crimes against humanity, or where it had not been proven that they were central to any criminal plan, they were acquitted”.

Indeed, there are examples of this kind, where justice does not slide into convictions in the absence of evidence merely to justify itself, from many other tribunals as well.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia convicted 93 people and acquitted 18 others. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted 61 individuals, while acquitting 14 others.

On September 16, in The Hague, the entire extraordinary history of Kosovo’s alliance with the West will be on trial.

The judges have the opportunity to show which way justice will tip: toward the aim of the court justifying itself with conviction statistics, trampling the principles of justice in order to believe an indictment based on hearsay and evidence from Serbia that the prosecution brought with the criminal aim of criminalizing the KLA.

Or toward recognizing Kosovo’s truth of freedom, which stands cemented in the purity of the KLA fighters’ resistance to oppression, in the suffering of families who lost thousands of loved ones, in the long journeys of nearly 1 million people who were forcibly expelled, and in the citadels of American and European diplomacy, which rallied to help the KLA in its battle and victory for freedom.