In early 2024, the rector of a university in Budapest received a surprising request from a senior Hungarian government official.
The official told the rector, Professor Gergely Deli, that Ludovika University of Public Service should organize a climate change conference and invite an unusual guest: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s highly controversial former president.
Even more shocking was the reason. The official told Professor Deli that the conference would serve only as cover, so that Ahmadinejad could hold secret talks in Budapest with operatives from Israeli intelligence, his declared enemy.
Deli knew that the invitation could damage his reputation and that of the university. Nevertheless, he said in an interview that he believed he could play a role in saving lives, The New York Times writes.
“You have two enemies, and if these enemies want to talk to each other, then it is better to do everything you can to help them talk,” he said.
Ahmadinejad’s visit to the university in 2024 and a second visit the following year were part of a multi-year Israeli effort to recruit him as an intelligence asset who, when the time came, could be installed as Iran’s new leader. That is what American and Iranian officials familiar with the operation said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
Recruiting Ahmadinejad was such a high priority for Israel that the then-director of Mossad, David Barnea, traveled to Budapest in 2024 to meet him in person, according to former American officials. Shortly after the meeting, they said, Mossad informed the CIA that it had established contact with Ahmadinejad.
Israel’s decision to build a regime-change plan around Ahmadinejad represents an extraordinary turn in the history of his relationship with the former Iranian president, who was known for accelerating Iran’s nuclear program, repeatedly calling for Israel’s destruction, and denying the Holocaust.
According to American officials, in recent years Israel had secretly paid Ahmadinejad money for accommodation and travel, while Israeli operatives had met with him on several occasions outside Iran, including during his trips to Budapest.
The effort culminated in late February this year—during the first days of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran—with a daring operation to extract the former president, who was living under tight surveillance in Tehran. The aim was to set in motion the plan to overthrow the current regime and bring Ahmadinejad to power.
The plan failed.
On February 28, an Israeli airstrike hit the compound where Ahmadinejad was located, targeting the building housing his bodyguards and an armored vehicle. After the strike, according to four senior Iranian officials, a black Peugeot arrived at the scene, picked up Ahmadinejad, and sped away from the chaotic scene.
American and Iranian officials familiar with the operation said the vehicle was driven by Mossad operatives, who took Ahmadinejad to a safe house in Iran.
However, the former Iranian president was angered by the rushed manner of the rescue operation and, according to people familiar with the matter, was disillusioned by the Israeli plan to bring him back to power.
He later left the safe house in circumstances that remain unclear. Ahmadinejad was not seen in public again until last Monday, when he briefly appeared in the funeral procession for the slain Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
His current status remains unclear. However, four senior Iranian officials said that Ahmadinejad is in the hands of the intelligence branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and has been placed under house arrest, after Iranian authorities learned about a large part of his contacts with Israel.
Israeli officials have not publicly commented on the plan to install Ahmadinejad at the helm of Iran, which was part of a broader effort to overthrow the government in Tehran. Another element of the plan involved arming and training Iranian Kurdish opposition forces based in northern Iraq, which would enter western Iran, hold territory, and then advance toward Tehran. This plan was never carried out.
The regime-change plan included “a sequence of special operations, very, very unique, that was supposed to happen,” Tamir Hayman, former chief of intelligence for the Israel Defense Forces, said on PBS’s “Firing Line” in May, after The New York Times first published details about Ahmadinejad’s role in the plan.
“And Ahmadinejad was part of that sequence.”
Mossad officials did not respond to requests for comment.
Ali Akbar Javanfekr, Ahmadinejad’s spokesman, also declined to comment.
A change after the presidency
As Iran’s president from 2005 to 2013, Ahmadinejad was the country’s best-known hard-line politician. He spoke of Israel’s disappearance and, during his rule, Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program, increasing suspicions that it was secretly pursuing the development of nuclear weapons.
Ahmadinejad ordered a violent crackdown on nationwide protests opposing his 2009 reelection and, during his term, the judiciary carried out mass executions of opponents and imprisoned dissidents and political rivals.
But in the years after leaving the presidency, Ahmadinejad softened his positions and toned down the anti-Israeli rhetoric that had characterized his time in power.
He often tried to project his new, more moderate image, giving interviews and speeches in which he talked about pop music culture in Iran, criticized the security forces for harshly suppressing protests, and accused the ruling elite of financial corruption.
He gave up his trademark beige jacket and began wearing custom-tailored suits. He groomed his beard, reportedly underwent Botox treatments, and began learning English.
In his Tehran office, he held public meetings every morning that lasted for hours, listening to the complaints of ordinary citizens. Some sought help getting past the bureaucratic obstacles of the state administration. From time to time, he wrote to ministries to recommend loans for people who came to him for help.
He traveled regularly throughout Iran, meeting supporters in cities and rural provinces.
Ahmadinejad’s relationship with the Iranian regime was complicated. The top leaders had marginalized him and restricted his movements, but at the same time had allowed him to retain a seat on a high-level council that advises the Supreme Leader. He attended a meeting of this council in February, just days before the war broke out.
Many people in Iran viewed Ahmadinejad’s transformation with skepticism, believing that he had political motives and was trying to strengthen his image as a populist politician while distancing himself from the ruling elite. He continued to enjoy support among some of Iran’s working class, and his advisers were convinced that his aim was to return to power.
“Ahmadinejad wouldn’t do this for money. He has money; he has an extensive economic network. He would do it for power. He wants to be at the helm of power,” said Abdolreza Davari, a former close associate and senior adviser to Ahmadinejad, in a telephone interview. Their relationship had broken down several years earlier.
According to a person in his inner circle, who spoke on condition of anonymity, Ahmadinejad had told several associates and trusted confidants about his ambition to become Iran’s next leader with the help of foreign powers.
He had become disillusioned with the Islamic Republic system after being disqualified from running for president three times. According to the same source, Ahmadinejad had concluded that he could not return to power as long as the current system remained in place.
He feared that, in the event of a war and regime change, the Americans and Israelis would choose some opposition figure outside Iran who did not know the country, which he believed would destabilize Iran.
According to this associate, Ahmadinejad told people close to him that he could play the role of a reformer, similar to former Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He had even said that, if he came to power, Iran would recognize Israel and normalize relations with it under the Abraham Accords promoted by President Donald Trump.
Israeli intelligence agencies were closely monitoring the growing rift between Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime during this period, according to two Israeli defense officials familiar with the intelligence assessments.
Of particular interest to Israel was Ahmadinejad’s growing dissatisfaction with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior regime figures, who had prevented him from running for president again.
Ahmadinejad’s actions also began to arouse suspicion within the intelligence branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is tasked with protecting the Islamic Republic from foreign interference.
According to two Guards members and an intelligence official familiar with the case, these suspicions intensified after Ahmadinejad began sending public letters to Donald Trump in 2017 and later to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Trump had publicly expressed appreciation for both of them.
After this year’s Israeli attack, which initially freed Ahmadinejad from Revolutionary Guard surveillance, Iranian intelligence services launched a broad investigation and began reconstructing his ties with Israel, according to four officials familiar with the matter.
It is unclear when Israeli operatives first attempted to recruit Ahmadinejad.
Iranian officials said there had been at least one contact during a trip Ahmadinejad made to Guatemala in 2023 to attend a conference devoted to the environment. The invitation had come from the government of Guatemala, a country with closer diplomatic relations with Israel than most Latin American states.
Ahmadinejad nearly failed to make the trip, after security forces stopped him at Tehran airport, refusing to issue his boarding pass and allow him to leave the country.
He staged a protest lasting several hours inside the airport, which turned into a public spectacle. During it, he took photographs with ordinary Iranian travelers, airport and airline employees, while constantly posting updates on his social media accounts.
In the end, Iranian authorities allowed him to board the plane and attend the conference.
“Some people told me not to travel to Guatemala; I told them that my brother, the Minister of the Environment, had invited me,” Ahmadinejad said in one of the videos posted during the trip.
“This is a very important country in Latin America.”
A year later, he made his first trip to Hungary to attend the Ludovika University conference, where he met David Barnea in Budapest. Barnea had led Mossad for five years, until last month.
Hungary, then led by right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, perhaps had the closest relations with Israel of any European country. Orbán and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had made reciprocal visits to each other’s countries.
In April 2025, Netanyahu himself also gave a speech at Ludovika University, which awarded him a public service prize.
Two months later, Ahmadinejad returned to Budapest, just days before Israel launched its war against Iran. According to the article, this visit served as cover for meetings with Israeli intelligence operatives.
Ahmadinejad’s Iranian bodyguards from the Revolutionary Guard’s Ansar unit, who accompanied him on all his trips abroad, reported that during the June 2025 visit he had managed to slip away from them at least twice and had remained missing for hours at a time.
In the report they prepared after the trip, the bodyguards said they had asked Ahmadinejad about these disappearances and he had replied that he had held meetings with university professors, according to two Revolutionary Guard members and an intelligence official.
During the university conference, the former Iranian president gave a lecture in English, surprising attendees after abandoning the Quranic verse he used to recite at the beginning of every speech.
Wearing a custom-tailored dark blue suit, he spoke about “our common humanity” and “a changing world order,” presenting his vision of how a new world could emerge, according to videos posted on his social media accounts.
Ahmadinejad gave Professor Gergely Deli, the university rector, a copy of the “Book of Kings” (Shahnameh), the work of the ancient Persian poet Ferdowsi.
Deli, in turn, gave Ahmadinejad the official insignia of Ludovika University.
In an interview last month, Professor Deli said that by sending Ahmadinejad the invitation, he had played the role of a “Strohmann”—a German term meaning “figurehead” or “puppet.”
Until last week, Ahmadinejad had not been seen in public since late February, when he sped away from his home in Tehran in the black Peugeot.
Last Monday, he suddenly appeared for a few moments in Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s funeral procession.
Footage from the funeral showed Ahmadinejad wearing a thick jacket, although the temperature was around 32 degrees Celsius, with a surgical mask lowered below his chin.
The other two living former presidents of Iran, Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami, had not been invited and were not seen at any of the funeral ceremonies.
Ahmadinejad stood with his head bowed, without speaking, surrounded on all sides by people who appeared to be members of the security forces.









