When enough Russians feel that the endless fighting in Ukraine is futile and that they themselves are paying the price, their president, Vladimir Putin, will be forced to do something spectacular to break the deadlock.

That is precisely why signs of fatigue or discontent in Russia are worth watching. The lead article in this week’s The Economist carries the most startling warning yet.

It comes from Andrey Melnichenko, the global “king” of chemical fertilizers and Russia’s biggest industrialist. Melnichenko is by no means part of the opposition to Putin. On the contrary, he belongs to the elite close to power, and his factories have supported the war economy. Nor is he speaking out of idealism.

After running his companies from outside Russia, Melnichenko returned in 2023, when the scope for global business narrowed. Like most oligarchs, he has lived by Putin’s rule: make money, but stay out of politics. Now he is speaking because he and other big businesspeople can no longer ignore the rot in a country they have watched slide toward tyranny.

Melnichenko issued this warning during more than 60 hours of interviews with The Economist, as well as in a more carefully worded essay being published online.

It is the first time an oligarch inside Russia has spoken at such length in public. We are giving him space not because we agree with all his views or because he is a champion of democracy and human rights. On the contrary, he is a pragmatist who wants to see his businesses thrive. That is precisely why his appeal could resonate in a country where lost wars, including defeat by Japan in 1905, have prompted industrialists to demand political change.

Melnichenko’s words go far beyond the war, describing a bleak future for Russia and its neighbors. He warns the West not to want Russia to sink into chaos, brutal autarky, or a dangerous and silent dependency. Although he does not say outright that Putin should leave power, the change he calls for would mean the end of one-man rule.

What makes Melnichenko’s intervention so important is that the war in Ukraine has now come home to Russia. Following Ukrainian attacks on the energy industry, the country is facing fuel queues and physical brawls at filling stations.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 boosted Putin’s popularity; today the peninsula is being isolated by Ukrainian drone attacks. Forced military mobilization is fueling discontent. Meanwhile, influencers’ complaints about the war are going viral on social media.

This reality contradicts Putin’s repeated promises that the “special military operation” is proceeding according to plan and that victory is near. Although the Russian economy is not on the brink of collapse and citizens are not ready to rise up in revolt, more and more Russians feel that their country has reached a dead end.

Putin could try to restore his authority by escalating the war and increasing repression at home. Some Western intelligence services have recently reported that Russia could intensify its confrontation with NATO. In the darkest scenario, Melnichenko fears the use of a tactical nuclear weapon to terrorize Ukraine’s European supporters, although most Western analysts continue to consider this unlikely.

According to Melnichenko, escalation would not bring lasting peace between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. He implies that if Russian citizens become even more alarmed by the war and revolt over mass mobilization and political repression, this would only deepen Putin’s problems at home, leading to a new cycle of escalation.

These bleak thoughts bring Melnichenko to the heart of his argument. He lays out several long-term scenarios for Russia that, he says, would be dangerous both for the country and for the world.

The most alarming scenario is one in which Russia sinks into anarchy, as local commanders fight for control of natural resources and nuclear weapons. The danger was so real that President Joe Biden’s administration tried to avoid Russia’s complete humiliation in Ukraine.

Another scenario is one in which Russia falls under the influence of foreign powers. It could be dominated by China, which would use it as a supplier of raw materials and a buffer zone against the United States. Or, after an exhausting war, Russia could remain on the periphery of Europe as a poor and dependent state. He says both scenarios would fuel discontent and violent nationalism that could one day erupt into conflict.

In the third scenario, Russia would turn inward, becoming a “North Korea”—an isolated fortress, with no economic growth and no capital. According to Melnichenko, this option is being seriously discussed inside the Kremlin. But, like North Korea, Russia would remain in a state of permanent war with the rest of the world.

Melnichenko is vague about how these scenarios could be avoided. In a way that also serves his own interests, he urges Western countries not to push the war to extreme limits. Instead, he says Russia and the West must find a way to live in peace. To achieve this, he calls for Russia to be guaranteed “sovereignty,” a concept that sounds very similar to China’s demand for non-interference.

He speaks very cautiously about domestic reforms in Russia. He says the country must become predictable to the world and win citizens’ support without using coercion. Implicitly, he wants Putin to give up one-person rule and share power, but he does not talk about democracy.

Even this would face resistance from the security apparatus, which has become the most powerful group since Putin pushed the first post-Soviet oligarchs out of politics more than two decades ago. If Russia were to become a more normal state, they would be the biggest losers. Nevertheless, technocrats and businesspeople who fear for the country’s future could side with Melnichenko. Putin may refuse to back down, but he is in a difficult position. Continuing the war, escalating it, and reforming each have their own costs.

History offers a precedent. In 1905, Russia lost a 19-month war against Japan. Industrialists and technocrats blamed Tsar Nicholas II, arguing that one-man rule was leaving Russia behind the rest of Europe. That same year, after an uprising, they forced the tsar to accept the October Manifesto, which provided for civil liberties and the creation of a legislative assembly.

However, by mid-1907, Nicholas II had quashed the reforms, and a decade later he was toppled by revolution. The hope is that Russia will learn this lesson: it needs reforms that last.