I have spent twenty-six years studying Vladimir Putin, as his number one foreign enemy, and during that time I have learned one thing about him more than anything else: whenever he has problems at home, he starts a war abroad. It has worked every time. Now it is no longer working, and a frightened Putin is far more dangerous — and far more revealing — than a self-confident Putin.
Look at the polls. Putin’s rating fell by 12.2 percentage points between the end of December and the end of April, dropping to 65.6 per cent — the lowest level recorded during Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, according to Russia’s state polling agency VTsIOM. The drop was so large that the Kremlin’s favourite pollster announced on May 15 that it would change its measurement methodology. Naturally, after that the figures rose a little. But this shows that his favourite trick is no longer working.
The Levada Center, the only independent polling agency in Russia, has tracked Putin’s ratings since the day he appeared on the political scene. I would not put much stock in the honesty of Russian citizens answering polls in a police state, but the shape of the graph tells a story that cannot be ignored. In 1999, when Putin became prime minister, nobody knew him and his popularity was almost zero. Then he launched a full-scale war in Chechnya, following a series of apartment building bombings that he blamed on the Chechens, and his support rose above 50 per cent. He was then elected president.
Since then, he has followed the same formula. When his popularity fell during the 2008 financial crisis, he invaded Georgia and his support rose. When it fell again in 2014, he annexed Crimea and entered eastern Ukraine. And when the political fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic came, he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. I have no doubt: Putin uses war as a political tool. It prevents his citizens from taking a close look at his failures.
But for this trick to work, there has always been one rule: the war must be far away. It must not touch the ordinary Russian citizen. The first three wars passed this test easily. The fourth was a much bigger gamble, and Putin knew it, so he took extraordinary measures to keep it away from the people.
He even refused to call it a war. It was a “special military operation,” and he insisted on this term so strongly that any Russian who called it a war could be sentenced to eight years in prison. He made sure that those fighting were not the people he cared about most. He offered prisoners amnesty in exchange for serving at the front. He left the hardest battles to mercenaries such as the Wagner Group. He paid hundreds of thousands of poor men from Russia’s poorest regions to go and die. He even brought in soldiers from North Korea and African mercenaries. The goal was always the same: for the average Russian to feel no sacrifice at all.
Why does this matter so much to him? Because, in my view, Russians are among the most selfish people in the world. I do not say this as an insult. I say it as a description of what the system has done to them. For decades under communism and for decades more afterward, anyone who thought about the common good beyond personal interest was punished. Under the Soviets, they were sent to the gulag. Under Putin, they are imprisoned or ostracized. If you train a people for two generations to care only about themselves, you create a country that is easy to rule, until the moment its personal interests are touched.
Now we are four years into this war, and every wall Putin built to keep it away from his people is crumbling.
The cost has been staggering. Western intelligence services and research institutes estimate that total Russian casualties, killed and wounded, are between 1.2 and 1.5 million soldiers. Ukraine is killing Russian soldiers faster than Russia can replace them. And the Kremlin is running out of money to pay the mercenaries and contract soldiers on whom it depends.
More importantly, Ukraine has found a way to bring the war to Russian territory. Ukrainian drones now strike Russian oil refineries, export terminals, military bases and targets inside Moscow itself. They have built drones that can penetrate more than 960 kilometres into Russian territory, something Ukraine could not even have imagined in 2022. The defences Putin built over four years are being destroyed, refinery by refinery.
You could see how worried he was during this year’s Victory Day parade. The Kremlin was so afraid of Ukrainian drones over Red Square that a preliminary ceasefire had to be arranged. The man who presents himself as the heir to the Soviet victory over Hitler could not guarantee the security of his own parade.
The signs of a man backed into a corner are everywhere. Putin spends most of his time in a bunker, afraid of being killed by a Ukrainian drone. He has restricted mobile internet in Moscow and St Petersburg. He has even acted against Telegram, the app used by almost every Russian, because he fears it could spark an uprising. But here lies his problem: each of these moves brings the war closer to Russians’ everyday lives. In a society where nobody thinks beyond their personal interests, once those interests are touched, everyone reacts immediately.
I will not predict that Putin will be toppled by a popular revolt. That would be premature. But it is not premature to say that he is genuinely afraid and has lost control of the story he has built over twenty-five years.
And that is precisely why this is the worst possible moment to push Ukraine toward a peace deal. When Putin is backed into a corner, the pressure should be on Russia, not Kyiv. Our task is to help Ukraine make Putin more frightened, more isolated and more surrounded, not to throw him a lifeline just as his oldest trick is finally failing.









