“Hashim Thaçi told the MPs, ‘What do you have to worry about? If the Specialist Court imprisons someone, it will be me and Kadri Veseli’.
This is what publicist Blerim Shala said in an interview with VOX Kosova, as he recounted what had persuaded former President Thaçi to accept the establishment of the Specialist Court.
Shala said that Thaçi knew he would be imprisoned by the Special Court, but stressed that he wanted to remove the “black cloud” from Kosovo, referring to the accusations made by Swiss senator Dick Marty in his infamous report, in which he accused the Kosovo Liberation Army of organ trafficking.
First, VOX journalist Lirim Mehmetaj asked Shala about the accusations made against Thaçi that he was accepting the establishment of the Specialist Court because he would face no personal consequences.
“At least, that was the accusation made by many of those who opposed the Court, until it became clear that, in fact, the opposite was true. It turned out that Thaçi was involved, as were Veseli and the others. And then they said: ‘Go ahead, Hashim.’ But that’s another topic. This accusation did exist, that Thaçi wouldn’t be taken,” Mehmetaj said.
But Shala recounts the opposite. He says that Thaçi had told PDK MPs—opponents of the Specialist Court—that if anyone was going to be subject to this mechanism, it would be him.
“Nait Hasani, Ganimete Musliu and several other PDK MPs were staunch opponents of the Specialist Court, especially Nait Hasani, who is one of the founders of the KLA. Hashim Thaçi also said: ‘Nait, if someone goes to prison, it’ll be me and Kadri. Not you.’ It was a public statement,” Shala emphasized.
“That is, if anyone from the KLA leadership was going to prison, I would go, not you. Hashim Thaçi accepted it, and all of us others—the major parties, PDK and LDK—accepted this Court, believing that we were putting the Dick Marty Report and the organ-trafficking issue behind us once and for all.”
Starting from the fact that the names mentioned in Marty’s Report were known, Shala stresses that the assumption at the time was that the arrests would begin with Thaçi.
“In any case, given the names mentioned in Dick Marty’s Report, it was assumed that the arrest would begin with Hashim Thaçi and the Drenica Group. The Drenica Group was present. So Hashim Thaçi never claimed or assumed that he would somehow be exempt from this.”
“You can’t treat the main person accused of crimes involving organ trafficking, who is named in the report, as if you can somehow forget about him along the way and instead deal with mid-level or low-level figures. But no one assumed in 2015 that this whole project would be diverted.”
Journalist Mehmetaj, recalling the friendship Shala had with Thaçi even at that time, asked him whether he had discussed personally why Thaçi had insisted so strongly on establishing a Court that would ultimately arrest him.
Above all the other reasons, former MP Shala said that Thaçi did it because of his personal relationship with the United States of America.
“Let’s not forget, Hashim Thaçi knew—and I believe all of us did—that without the United States of America, we would neither have been liberated nor become an independent state. After all, Hashim Thaçi’s personal career is also linked to the support America gave him.”
“From Rambouillet onward, the idea was to transform the KLA into a political party and, through the political party, try to build his vision.”
In this regard, he believes that Thaçi “felt a kind of moral debt to America.” “But a moral debt also to his own conscience, and to our collective conscience, if I may put it that way.”
He says that organ trafficking would “bring the KLA’s war crashing down.” “Even if the entire war had been conducted properly, an act like that would have brought it crashing down.”
“So,” he stresses, “it was essential to address this issue once and for all.” “Of course, this can be linked by you or me to particular states that were unhappy that Kosovo had become an independent state. I’m also talking about Western states—not the big ones, not the big ones, but those that do not recognize [Kosovo’s independence] and other states.”
Shala stresses that Kosovo’s liberation and statehood project was “considered an American project,” adding that at the time the Specialist Court project was also “considered an American project.”
“And now the Specialist Court project, too, was considered an American project. The Europeans also told us: ‘As far as we’re concerned, you don’t need to establish the Court, but your friends are telling you that the Court must be established, so establish it. As far as we’re concerned, it’s nothing.’”
“I met, let’s not forget, with a very senior EULEX representative, who later had a diplomatic career and who had access to the files on KLA commanders and senior officials held by UNMIK and EULEX. They had pooled them. And when I asked him, ‘Is there anything in those files?’, he said, ‘There’s nothing. If there had been anything serious, we would have filed indictments. Why send them to The Hague?’ But, he said, what the Specialist Chambers did was come and take those files. They used those files to produce their own documentation.”
Shala recalls that Kosovo had precedents when it came to indictments and convictions of senior KLA leaders.
“If it had been the first case, someone could have said, ‘Wait a minute, maybe Kosovo will rise up. Maybe it will cause a major problem.’ Remi was convicted. Latif Gashi was convicted during UNMIK’s time, as were Sylejman Selimi and Sami Lushtaku. In other words, very prominent KLA figures were convicted and sent to prison.”
In this context, Shala asks, “Did any uprising happen in Kosovo?” “No. Because we still believed—and to this day we believe—in international justice.”
“Therefore, I can’t say there were no such precedents. There were. They had no consequences whatsoever for security and stability in Kosovo. And in the end, they all went to prison voluntarily. Let’s not forget that Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi also went to prison voluntarily. Someone might say they had no other option,” Shala said, as Mehmetaj interjected to tell him that they did: “They did it themselves; they could have refused.”
Although they could have refused, Shala stresses that they did not, just as other KLA commanders who had been subject to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had not refused.
He says all this happened because the Chief Prosecutor of that Tribunal, Carla del Ponte, wanted to balance the guilt of the states and peoples who had fought.
“I think that, as in the cases of Ramush Haradinaj, Fatmir Limaj and the others, when they went to the Hague Tribunal, we also had the Hague Tribunal’s screening process, let’s not forget. The KLA’s wartime cases reached there too. And in all of them—I know this first-hand—Carla del Ponte wanted to balance, to even out, the guilt of the states and peoples that had fought.”
“She said, ‘Fine, I have about 10–15 Serbs; I need about 7–8 Croats, but I also need about 3–4 Albanians, because why should only the Albanians turn out to be innocent?’ And she took two cases. When Soren Jessen-Petersen spoke with Carla del Ponte about Ramush’s case, Soren Jessen-Petersen was the head of UNMIK. He knew Ramush’s case was coming and told her privately: ‘Look, Ramush Haradinaj is a hero of Kosovo.’”
“She said, ‘Ooh, how many heroes have I put in prison? Why shouldn’t I put Ramush Haradinaj in prison?’ But it turned out to be a mistake, because Ramush was acquitted twice.”
In general, Shala says that the KLA went through several filters: UNMIK, EULEX, The Hague, the Hague Tribunal. “Therefore, I’m saying all of this could have been handled in Kosovo by establishing the Specialist Chambers in Kosovo, with international judges and international prosecutors.”
Given the international pressure to establish the Specialist Court, as well as the accusations in Marty’s Report, he says that PDK and LDK—the parties governing together at the time—were persuaded to establish this mechanism, “and in this way we would fulfill a very major obligation that Kosovo has.”
Looking back at 2015, Shala stresses that “I don’t know that we could have done anything else.” “To be completely honest, I mean.”
He points out that the other options were “certainly more dangerous than this one.” “This one, too, was full of risks, as we later saw and came to understand, but the other options were even more dangerous. And ultimately, it was a sacrifice that all of us made for the state of Kosovo.”








