Six days before the election, more than two dozen of President Trump’s top strategists joined a private video meeting.

The mood was bleak. The discussion began with talk of poison.

“Do you want the white pill first, or the black pill first?” asked Tony Fabrizio, the president’s chief pollster.

Tim Saler, one of the Republican Party’s top data consultants, laid out two scenarios.

In the first, the $400 million super PAC MAGA Inc. was reaching the voters it had wanted and expected to turn out.

“That’s the optimistic scenario,” he said.

The other was a total rout.

“I’m getting my affairs in order,” said James Blair, who had left the White House to oversee the president’s midterm strategy, prompting laughter, according to four people on the call.

“I suggest everyone else do the same.”

For about 30 minutes, the call continued with dark humor: funeral arrangements, prison food, presidential pardons, and even a brief joke about leaving the country.

“At least Bibi won. He’ll protect us,” Mr. Blair said sarcastically of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose country had voted the day before. (Mr. Netanyahu’s bloc fell short of a majority, and his party soon claimed the election had been stolen.)

“Maybe we can get asylum in Israel,” Mr. Fabrizio said.

Electoral Collapse

The scale of the Republican damage would become clear a week later.

Democrats surged toward a large majority in the House of Representatives and won control of the Senate, a remarkable achievement powered by victories in Republican strongholds — Kansas, South Carolina, Texas — that few could have imagined a year earlier.

This account of the Republican Party’s collapse is based on interviews with more than 70 people — including lawmakers, political strategists, party leaders, pollsters, White House officials and congressional aides — directly involved in the midterm elections, many of whom were granted anonymity to describe private conversations and decisions.

The scale of the defeat was by no means inevitable.

Republicans had record fundraising, the world’s richest man, a favorable Supreme Court decision on campaign financing and a demoralized and unpopular opposition.

In the Senate, they had a map that required Democrats to compete in states they had not won in decades.

And in the House of Representatives, Trump’s team cast aside the tradition of redrawing congressional district boundaries only once a decade, creating new districts that would help the G.O.P. strengthen its narrow majority.

What Republicans could not overcome was a president who had lost the public’s confidence on the economy and much else.

And what they had not counted on was an unpopular war in the Middle East, one that would close the Strait of Hormuz and push gas prices above $4 a gallon, continuing throughout the election campaign.

And Democrats were ready, this time, to seize on the G.O.P.’s setbacks.

A Stark Warning About the Iran War

The slide deck Blair had circulated over the summer to officials in the West Wing was bleak.

One slide linked Republicans’ polling numbers to a timeline of the Iran war.

It showed how the Democratic advantage had grown during active hostilities, narrowed during talks for a “memorandum of understanding,” and then grown again when the cease-fire fell apart.

By the end of July, Democrats had a 10-point lead on the congressional ballot.

The “bottom line” was hard to miss. It was highlighted in yellow: Republicans could still win the House of Representatives if Democrats had only a four-point lead. But that would not happen without an extended cease-fire, the Strait of Hormuz open and gas prices falling, the slide warned.

“A final outcome approaching D+10 is likely to cost us the Senate.”

Tuesday’s results were even worse.

Trump’s party is on track to lose the national congressional popular vote by about 13 points, according to estimates by The New York Times.

It is shaping up to be the worst loss in half a century, since the fallout from the Watergate scandal.

Even before the polls closed, Trump had begun thinking about what might have happened.

“If we had never gone into Iran, what do you think would have happened in the midterms?” the president had privately asked, according to someone who had spoken with him.

An Unchecked Second Term

Did the war become such a powerful force because it told voters a simple story?

As a candidate, Trump had promised there would be no new wars. He started a new war.

He promised lower prices. Gas prices rose and inflation climbed.

The story of the G.O.P.’s midterm collapse was not just a story of broken promises; it was also a story of radical excess.

After Mr. Trump returned from being a pariah following Jan. 6, 2021, some advisers believed he had convinced himself that the rules of politics had been suspended just for him. That illusion was dispelled on Tuesday night.

Over the course of roughly two years, swagger had become the governing philosophy of Trump’s second presidency.

There had been a seemingly endless stream of investigative articles revealing that Trump, his family and their close associates had used the presidency to enrich themselves shamelessly.

Those reports began to resonate with voters; an early October poll by Fox News showed corruption as voters’ top concern.

(Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, said: “The president acts solely in the best interests of the American people. There are no conflicts of interest.”)

In 2025, Trump launched a trade war with the whole world, the pain of which was still being felt more than a year later on farms across the battleground states of Kansas, Texas and Iowa.

Throughout all this, the president showed indifference to the struggles of Americans whose lives his policies had made harder.

Rising gas prices?

“A small price to pay,” Mr. Trump insisted.

Some members of his team grew frustrated as Trump talked more about his new ballroom than the border, golf courses rather than grocery prices, interior decorating rather than inflation.

On the eve of the midterm elections, he focused his closing remarks on renovating the Reflecting Pool on the National Mall, joking that he was considering naming it after himself instead of Abraham Lincoln.

Unlike in the past, Democrats largely avoided Trump’s daily distractions and tried to link corruption to costs.

They also told the story of a government focused on elites while ordinary people suffered, from Jeffrey Epstein’s protected associates to the president’s $2.2 billion in personal gains.

In the House of Representatives, Democrats quickly and unexpectedly fought Trump’s redistricting initiative and fielded strong candidates deep in Republican territory to spread out the map.

In the Senate, they found a series of first-rate candidates who made once-unthinkable states competitive. In the final, frenzied weeks of the campaign, Republicans were redirecting money from the usual swing states of North Carolina and Georgia to try to shore up traditional strongholds in South Carolina and even Mississippi.

The Iran war, Representative Hakeem Jeffries of New York, the Democratic leader and now the expected next speaker, said, helped “supercharge” the contrast between the two parties.

Republicans had tried to frame the midterms as a choice between “common sense and madness,” repeatedly attacking the growing social-democratic wing of the left.

Yet Trump’s own pollster’s final poll, conducted two weeks before the election, showed that while both the Republicans’ MAGA brand and the social democrats were unpopular with voters, MAGA was more to blame.

When Republicans who were not planning to vote were asked what it would take to win back their votes, their top two answers were ending the war and addressing inflation.

On that final call before Election Day, Trump’s advisers were both realistic and cynical about the state of the race, at one point referring to a Trump ally who ran for governor of Minnesota and sought a recount in his primary despite losing by a wide margin.

“Look, it’s fine,” Mr. Blair told the group sarcastically. “I think we’ll just do like Mike Lindell and call for a recount no matter how many points down we are.”

Alex Pfeiffer, a spokesman for the MAGA Inc. super PAC, said the group’s “measured and realistic vision of the political environment” led to investment in House races where Republicans are ahead, in Maine, Florida, Tennessee, New York and Texas.

“The people peddling these made-up lines and false rumors not only underestimate the president’s historic and generous investment in the party’s midterm effort, but also disparage the hard work of the many people who contributed to this effort,” he said in a statement.

“They are cowards and losers.”

A White House official, who declined to speak on the record, said in response to the reporting for this article:

“President Trump was not on the ballot, and it has been proven that Trump voters turn out when he is on the ballot. Candidate quality matters, and President Trump did a better job promoting many of the candidates on the ballot than the candidates themselves did.”

The official reiterated that the president, who acknowledged earlier Wednesday that the war had affected the midterms, had repeatedly said Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon.

The Anti-Recruiter

While Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, the Democratic leader, carefully recruited high-caliber Senate candidates, Trump took a series of steps that put the Republican majority at risk.

After Senator John Ernst of Iowa opposed Trump’s most controversial nominees and Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina voted against his signature tax-and-spending bill, Trump allies threatened to end their careers.

Both decided to retire, creating vulnerable vacancies in seats once held by Republicans.

In North Carolina, Trump cleared the field for Michael Whatley, a former lobbyist and Republican National Committee chairman, who proved to be a lackluster candidate and lost to Roy Cooper, the state’s popular former Democratic governor.

After Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina died in July, Trump backed installing his sister, Darline, not only to replace him temporarily but also to run for a full six-year term. In doing so, he elevated an inexperienced candidate with no fundraising base, and she lost in a state that had not elected a Democrat to the Senate since 1998.

But no candidate proved more costly to the party than Ken Paxton, Texas’s scandal-plagued attorney general.

Trump backed him against Senator John Cornyn, the Republican incumbent, brushing aside a year of warnings that Paxton would put the seat at risk.

Republicans were ultimately forced to spend close to $300 million in Texas, money that could have gone to support candidates in other states.

Paxton lost by 12 points.

On another final call, Trump’s team mocked the incompetence of some of the Republicans they were trying to elect.

“I’ve seen the enemy,” Mr. Blair told the group a week earlier. “And it is us.”

Fabrizio replied: “In a lot of places.”

The Democrats’ Playbook

In May 2025, Schumer arrived at Wildflower Farms, a luxury resort in New York’s Hudson Valley, for a secret retreat with donors and party officials.

He desperately needed to expand the Senate map.

To win control of the Senate, Democrats had to hold all their seats and flip at least four, including in states Trump had carried handily in 2024.

Schumer spent months courting Mr. Cooper and made at least three trips to Ohio to persuade former Senator Sherrod Brown, who had lost in 2024 but had a populist brand suited to the country’s mood.

“If you retire and we lose the majority by one vote, you won’t enjoy your retirement,” Mr. Schumer, 73, is recalled telling Mr. Brown.

Both ran and won.

In the House of Representatives, where Democrats had fallen three seats short in 2024, recruiters went hunting in districts Trump had won by 10 points or more, betting early that the emboldened president would overreach.

A postmortem analysis of the election by the Democratic House Majority PAC, circulated in April 2025, found that two factors stood out among the party’s strongest candidates in 2024: being “perceived as moderate” and focusing on the economy.

“If we wanted to compete deeper in red districts, we had to find candidates who weren’t immediately disqualifying,” said Mike Smith, the PAC’s president.

They began recruiting candidates with distinctive biographies: military veterans, doctors, farmers, a smokejumper, a Tejano music star, almost anyone who did not look like a career politician.

The Redistricting Wars

Trump, meanwhile, was trying to build the House battlefield himself.

In the spring of 2025, Blair, then his deputy chief of staff, brought the president a plan to redraw congressional maps mid-decade to make seats safer for Republicans. The gerrymandering initiative began in Texas and quickly spread to other Republican-led states.

When Jeffries first heard about the maneuver in Texas, he turned to his advisers in disbelief and declared:

“You’ve got to be kidding me.”

He flew to Texas to urge state lawmakers to stand their ground, and many Democrats left the state to slow the legislative process.

But the Trump-inspired gambit passed, and Republicans created five new seats for themselves that Mr. Trump would have won by double digits in 2024, seemingly enough to withstand even a midterm decline in support.

Democrats fought back.

California voters approved Governor Gavin Newsom’s plan to create five new Democratic-favoring seats, and Virginia voters approved a map creating four more, though the state’s Supreme Court later struck it down.

From the outset, Blair was confident in his redistricting plan, and he and the president dismissed Republicans who worried the maneuver would backfire.

But by April 2026, Democrats had good reason to believe they had neutralized the threat by redrawing districts in several blue states.

Mr. Jeffries held a celebratory news conference featuring a poster with the faces of Mr. Trump and Mr. Blair and an anonymous quote that had appeared in a Times article about redistricting:

“Maximum warfare everywhere, all the time.”

When Mr. Blair saw the poster, he messaged one of Mr. Jeffries’s top aides, Gideon Bragin.

“Can you send a copy of this to my office?”

Instead, it remained inside the Democratic House campaign headquarters until Election Day, when a blue wave swept through even many of the districts drawn to favor Republicans.

Unforced Errors

As 2026 began, the administration’s immigration enforcement surge turned violent in Minneapolis when two protesters were shot and killed by federal agents. Both killings were captured on video.

Trump told advisers he did not like how the videos looked.

Susie Wiles, the White House chief of staff, had spent months privately trying to steer him away from the hard-line immigration approach favored by Stephen Miller, the president’s top policy adviser.

Immediately after Minneapolis, Democrats’ internal polls showed the party taking the lead on immigration for the first time.

What had been one of Trump’s enduring strengths became, for a time, his chief liability, according to one of the president’s top strategists.

Then, about five weeks after the second killing, Trump took the country to war in Iran.

Blair initially shared his boss’s optimism that the war would be a quick success. He reassured skeptical colleagues that the conflict would not be the political catastrophe some feared, because some Defense Department officials had assured the White House it would be resolved quickly.

But the president’s four-to-six-week timeline stretched into months.

In public, Trump boasted of a decisive military triumph. In private, advisers briefed him on the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, rising gas and fertilizer prices, and an alarming depletion of American munitions.

Mr. Fabrizio’s focus groups in March, about two weeks after the conflict began, showed that voters did not understand why the president had started the war. They saw a broken promise that was making life more expensive.

Former antiwar allies on the right, including Tucker Carlson and former Georgia congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, were now in open revolt.

Mr. Trump knew the war was eroding his support, according to advisers, but for a brief moment it seemed he had found a way out of the mess.

By mid-June, Vice President JD Vance had negotiated a memorandum of understanding with Iran, and Trump’s political team breathed a sigh of relief.

Mr. Fabrizio’s first poll on the proposal found that voters aware of the agreement favored it by 41 percentage points, and 67 percent thought it would lower gas prices.

But G.O.P. Iran hawks, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, pressured Mr. Trump to maintain pressure on Tehran. The agreement collapsed and the war dragged on.

“My Money”

Mr. Trump never stopped fundraising after the 2024 election, amassing a war chest of about $400 million, which he made clear to advisers he viewed as “my money.”

By August, with the election less than 100 days away, Republican Senate strategists still had no clarity on where Team Trump would spend. One of them described being “shocked at how unprepared they were.”

A Trump adviser said there was a plan, but it could not be shared because the president had not approved it.

Some days, Mr. Trump privately told advisers:

“We have to win. Whatever it takes.”

Other days, he seemed unconcerned.

“This says something very nice about me, that they just can’t win without me,” he told aides.

Blair and others had to persuade the president to sign off on spending.

Trump held off on his approval until the end of the summer.

The delay was costly: Ad prices rose as the election approached.

During one week in mid-October at a single station in Anchorage, Trump’s super PAC paid almost four times as much as the leading Democratic super PAC to air about 70 percent fewer ads, because it had not booked the time well in advance.

The Democratic group paid $2,700 for an ad on the local evening news; Mr. Trump’s super PAC paid $30,000 for the same slot.

Typically, endangered lawmakers distance themselves from an unpopular president in midterm elections. Team Trump wanted to do the opposite.

“We’ve taken that old structure and turned it upside down,” said Chris LaCivita, Trump’s co-campaign manager in 2024.

That is how the first modern midterm convention was born, a two-day celebration of the president in Dallas in September that few members of his party had wanted.

During his convention speech, Trump floated a new proposal to send $5,000 to every American adult — but only if Republicans won.

Almost no one knew it was coming, including his top political advisers, the chair and the Senate majority leader.

The idea had not even been tested in a poll before Trump said it.

And when a similar proposal was tested, Trump’s team found it did little to move voters toward Republicans. Some of the president’s own advisers recoiled at the payout, with one describing it as an overt attempt to “buy” people for their votes.

The convention brought one piece of good news: money.

On the first day, Elon Musk sent $75 million to the Senate Leadership Fund, the super PAC led by allies of Senate Majority Leader John Thune of South Dakota.

It was one of the largest single contributions in American history.

At the convention, Paxton entered the fund’s suite, where Alex Latcham, the super PAC’s executive director, made a somewhat cryptic remark to him.

“You’ll be happy tomorrow.”

The ads were about to start.

Musk would spend more than $450 million to help Republicans in the midterms, most of it in Texas to try to save Mr. Paxton. The super PAC he funded spent tens of millions on ads attacking the Democratic candidate, James Talarico, for his support of transgender rights, reflecting a line of attack Trump’s team had used successfully in 2024.

In other races, the focus on transgender ads became a point of contention between officials at the Senate Leadership Fund and Mr. Trump’s operation, who argued that the 2026 elections were fundamentally about the economy and that running ads on other subjects would be less effective. G.O.P. Senate strategists saw economic messages fall flat in the current political environment in some states.

The fight to save the Senate was hampered by a party leadership that could barely work together.

Mr. Trump and the G.O.P. leaders in the Senate, including Mr. Thune, never came close.

The president backed Paxton over their objections. And when Trump’s advisers met with officials from the leading Republican super PAC at Camp David in March 2026 to plan for the midterms, no one from the National Republican Senatorial Committee was invited.

The Collapse

In late August, Julie Merz, the top strategist at the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, gathered her team and showed a slide estimating a 35 percent chance of a “blue wave.”

“It is our job,” she is recalled saying, “to put out as many surfboards as possible.”

Committee officials made the party’s most vulnerable representatives an unusual offer.

Instead of spending millions to protect them, the party would move money into redder territory and poll their seats to see whether they needed the resources again. Most agreed, freeing up about $10 million to expand the map.

Not long after the Republican convention in Dallas, oil prices hit all-time highs.

In the Senate, things got so bad for the G.O.P. that by early October Republicans were ordering polls in seemingly unimaginable states like South Dakota and Idaho.

A month before the election, the Senate Leadership Fund pulled its ads out of North Carolina, abandoning the state to redirect money to Kansas, then South Carolina and eventually Mississippi — a state Mr. Trump had won by nearly 23 points two years earlier.

“Battleground Mississippi,” Trump’s advisers mockingly called it on a call.

In the House of Representatives, the deterioration was perhaps even worse.

At one point, top officials at the Congressional Leadership Fund and Mr. Trump’s super PACs had decided to give up on flipping Representative Henry Cuellar’s seat in South Texas — only to realize that Speaker Mike Johnson was scheduled to be in the district the day the ads were set to come off the air. They delayed the announcement by a day to spare Mr. Johnson an awkward episode.

Cuellar won reelection by a landslide.

In the end, the map shifted so far left that House Republicans — who polled more than 100 seats — could not keep up.

This surprised even some top Democrats.

At a dinner in September, Rahm Emanuel, who led the Democrats’ House campaign arm during the 2006 wave, asked the party’s top recruiters how much Mr. Trump had won their districts by. When Zach Dembo, a military veteran and former federal prosecutor running in Kentucky’s Sixth District, said 15 points, Mr. Emanuel looked at him in disbelief.

Mr. Dembo won.

The final Sunday before Election Day, Mr. Jeffries organized one last symbolic stop in a battleground district.

He went to Alabama, where Republicans had redrawn Representative Shomari Figures’s district to favor their party after a Supreme Court decision weakened the Voting Rights Act.

It was important to go there, Mr. Jeffries said, because “he was facing a renewed effort to subject the African American community to Jim Crow-style tactics.”

“It’s fair to say that both Shomari and I felt the weight of history, given the fact that the civil rights movement led by Dr. King, Rosa Parks and so many others began right in the place where we were closing out this very important 2026 campaign,” Mr. Jeffries said.

Figures won his race on Tuesday.

On the way to the airport, Jeffries made an unpublicized stop at the Freedom Monument Sculpture Park, which commemorates the history of enslaved people in America.

In January, Jeffries is now poised to become the first Black speaker in American history.